Machine replacement, Network Externalities and Investment Cycles by Juan Ruiz
Machine Replacement, Network Externalities,
and Investment Cycles∗
Juan M. Ruiz†
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
October, 2002
Abstract
This paper presents a model where agents decide on the timing of replacement of ageing
machines. The optimal replacement policy for an agent is inﬂuenced by other agents’ decisions
because the productivity of a particular vintage displays network externalities that set in with a
lag. In equilibrium, agents follow innovation cycles with a frequency that is lower than optimal,
so there is too much delay. One extreme case is the possibility of ineﬃcient collapse: for
some parameters there is no investment in equilibrium, even though it is socially optimal that
agents (eventually) invest in cycles. Another feature of the model is the tendency of agents to
synchronize their individual decisions, and thus the outcome of the aggregate economy does not
smooth out the non-convexities present at the microeconomic level.
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11 Introduction
This paper explores the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates when underlying microeconomic
decisions are non-convex and network externalities aﬀect the proﬁtability of each agents’ action
with a lag. We ask two speciﬁc questions. First, do agents coordinate their actions in the presence
of network externalities, and thus transmit the variability of their micro actions into aggregate
variables; and second, is the social optimum the outcome of one of the equilibria in this setting.
We ﬁnd that, in equilibrium, agents tend to synchronize their actions, and thus if we look at an
aggregate variable, we will still observe some lumpiness that is not smoothed out by aggregation.
Moreover, these aggregate cycles display a frequency that is lower than optimal, so for a number of
users bigger than a speciﬁc threshold, there is always ineﬃcient delay in this economy, whereas in
previous work the outcome of one of the (multiple) equilibria was equivalent to the socially optimal
policy.
The issue of whether the lumpiness of economic decisions at the microeconomic level gets
smoothed out by aggregation is not a theoretical curiosity. Work by Bertola and Caballero (1990)
and Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1995) for example, show that the presence of nonconvexities
at the microeconomic level is an important feature that we have to consider if we want to explain
the lumpiness found in the data, especially for investment in equipment and purchases of durable
goods. It is also this lumpiness at the micro level (usually generated by some degree of irreversibil-
ity), together with the evolution of the cross sectional distribution of agents, that may generate
interesting aggregate dynamics when coupled with idiosyncratic and common uncertainty.
The issue of externalities and the timing of individual decisions has been extensively studied in
the literature. Previous work by Shleifer (1986) and Gale (1995, 1996) showed how the presence
of positive externalities can lead to delay of individual’s actions and to cycles in macroeconomic
aggregates. In Shleifer (1986), externalities are pecuniary in nature, and the continuous arrival
of investment opportunities is transformed into aggregate cycles of investment activity. This is
the result of the incentive to synchronize individual investment decisions to take advantage of the
positive externality through increased aggregate activity. While Shleifer emphasizes the multiplicity
of equilibria in this context, our work focuses on the ampliﬁcation of the nonconvexities observed
at the individual level and on the eﬃciency properties of the equilibrium cycles.
Gale (1995) focuses on the incentives for delay in a dynamic model of coordination. The basic
1idea is that agents would want to “invest” at times of high aggregate activity, and this coordination
problem introduces the possibility of ineﬃcient delay. One particular shortcoming of this model is
that, even though the game has an inﬁnite horizon, agents get to act only once, so some interesting
issues arising in investment decisions (which usually call for agents to act more than once) cannot
be analyzed. Gale (1996) develops a model addressing precisely that issue, with agents that get
to act more that once in the course of the game.1 In this second paper, there is again a positive
externality from the level of aggregate activity, which generates incentives for delay in recessions,
eﬀectively increasing the amplitude and reducing the frequency of the underlying (stochastic) cycle.
Another strand of the literature has studied the eﬀect of complementarities on the behavior of
macroeconomic aggregates. The closest work to our own is that of Cooper and Haltiwanger (1992),
where it is shown that macroeconomic aggregates do not necessarily smooth out non-convexities
at the individual level. The basic idea is that the presence of strategic complementarities gives
an incentive to individual agents to “bunch” their actions, and so the lumpiness intrinsic in the
individual decision process is transmitted into the aggregate time series of investment. The analysis
is carried out separately for the timing decision (synchronization versus staggering), and then for
the periodicity of the action. However, when both the timing and periodicity decisions are taken
together, the problem of multiplicity of equilibria makes it very diﬃcult to give a clear prediction
about the outcome one would expect from the model.
This paper attempts to combine the two strands of the literature on externalities and the
timing of individual decisions, and analyze the eﬀect of complementarities on the behavior of
macroeconomic aggregates, when individuals face a non-convex problem. In particular, we consider
a model where agents are inﬁnitely lived and each one operates a machine that is subject to
obsolescence due to the arrival of new vintages every period. At any time, each agent has the option
of switching to another vintage after incurring a ﬁxed cost. This describes a well known machine
replacement problem that has been extensively studied in the operations research literature. In
this deterministic setup, the optimal policy calls for an agent to update his machine to the “state
of the art” machine at regular intervals. A complete characterization of the solution in this case is
shown in the ﬁrst section of the paper and it serves as a benchmark for the rest of the analysis.
In order to introduce network externalities into the problem, we assume that the proﬁtability
of using a particular vintage depends on the number of users of that vintage. As it is well known,
and the papers mentioned above suggest, one of the problems of models with payoﬀ spillovers is
the emergence of multiple equilibria, especially when agents are forward looking.2 However, some
1Although the results in Gale (1996) require that an each period there is a positive probability that an agent will
exit the game forever, so in eﬀect agents in this model are not inﬁnitely lived.
2See for example Krugman (1991) and Matsuyama (1991) for a discussion of the role of expectations in models
2recent literature has focused on the timing of the externality (i.e. contemporaneous versus leading
or lagging externalities) and the eﬀect on the multiplicity of equilibria.3 Following that literature,
we introduce externalities that set in with a lag, so that the proﬁtability of using a particular vintage
depends on the number of people who used that vintage the previous period. For new machines
that just appeared in the market, there is no history of previous use, and so, no externality built-in.
Thus, two forces inﬂuence the returns from a particular vintage in the ﬁrst periods of its appearance
in the market: obsolescence reduces the proﬁtability of a machine as time passes, whereas, if agents
coordinate on adopting a particular vintage, when the externality sets in, it may well outweigh the
eﬀect of obsolescence at least initially.
The introduction of lagging externalities gives rise to interesting phenomena in this model that
distinguish it from previous work, especially Shleifer (1986) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (1992).
First of all, it greatly reduces the set of equilibria (as compared to the case of contemporaneous ex-
ternalities), although, contrary to Adser` a and Ray (1997), it does not result in a unique equilibrium
except for very particular cases. Second, contrary to Shleifer (1986) and Cooper and Haltiwanger
(1992), when the user base is big enough, all equilibria in our model are ineﬃcient, since the in-
novation cycles that arise in equilibrium have a lower frequency than optimal. Our model exhibits
ineﬃcient delay since there is a tendency for agents to free ride on other agents adopting a new
technology ﬁrst, (delaying the switching cost of adopting a new machine and leaving to others the
task of building up the externality associated with the new adopted vintage), only to follow them
after a few periods and switch to that vintage (even though it is no longer the “state of the art”),
when it has been used for some time and the eﬀect of network externalities has had time to “set
in”.
The last interesting result is derived from the incentive to coordinate the adoption of new ma-
chines to take advantage of the vintage-speciﬁc spillovers. This in turn implies that the aggregate
time series of investment in this model will not smooth out the non-convexities found at the microe-
conomic level. Although we can construct a staggered equilibrium that would in practice provide
the smoothing of individual lumpiness for any size of the user base, it does not seem to be robust to
a small perturbation of the distribution of agents across vintages, and the synchronized equilibrium
is shown to be the unique (stable) steady state for the particular case of zero switching costs.4
with forward looking, inﬁnitely lived agents whose decisions have some degree of irreversibility and where there are
payoﬀ externalities.
3InG a l e( 1 9 9 5), the issue of the timing of the externality is analyzed in discrete time and in a strategic context.
In Gale (1996), lagging externalities help to pin down a unique equilibrium for the dynamic game.U sing a setup
very similar to that of Krugman (1991), Adser´ aa n dRay (1997) show how imposing a lag for the externality to “set
in” reduces the set of equilibria, and, with non-strategic agents, results in a unique equilibrium
4In a separate paper, we analyze the robustness of this result to the introduction of a small degree of heterogeneity
on the distribution of agents operating machines.F or example, when the adoption costs are diﬀerent across consumers,
3The next section describes the model in detail, specifying the particular form of network exter-
nalities introduced and the choice of solution concept. Section three develops the solution to the
planner’s problem, for a particular initial condition. Those results would then serve as a benchmark
to analyze the eﬃciency properties of the equilibrium cycles. Section four deals with the conditions
necessary for synchronization in the steady state and the eﬃciency properties of the equilibrium
cycles. In section ﬁve we introduce staggered equilibria and give some intuition why the staggered
steady state may be considered a “knife edge” case in a sense made speciﬁc in that section. Parts
six and seven give further insight into why synchronization may be considered the “natural” out-
come of the game. Finally, section eight include some concluding remarks and further avenues of
research.
2M o d e l
This is an economy with a mass N of inﬁnitesimal, inﬁnitely-lived agents. Each agent operates one
machine, indexed by age x (which is also the time elapsed since it appeared in the market). New
machines appear every period and agents have at any time the possibility to scrap their machine
and adopt a machine of a diﬀerent vintage (age) by paying the switching cost c ≥ 0. The problem
of each agent is to choose switching dates and target vintages over an inﬁnite horizon to maximize
the present discounted value of payoﬀs net of switching costs. Each agent discounts the future at
the common discount factor β = 1
1+r.
2.1 Payoﬀs
At each period t, the pattern of use of diﬀerent vintages across agents can be characterized by the
distribution nt = {n0t,n 1t,n 2t,...},w h e r enxt represents the mass of users of vintage x at time t
and of course we require 0 ≤ nxt ≤ N and
∞
x=0 nxt = N at every t.
To introduce lagging externalities into the model, we will assume that the payoﬀ derived from
a machine of a particular vintage depends, in part, on how extensively it was used the previous
period, and will denote by F(x,nx−1,t−1) the payoﬀ at time t of using a machine of age x. The
motivation for a payoﬀ function of this sort could be any industry which depends on another
“upstream” industry for “technical support” for example. We may think that the availability of
support –the number of repair shops, for example– for a particular vintage depends on how
the synchronized equilibrium will still be an equilibrium in the modiﬁed model when the variability of those costs is
small enough.
4spread the use of that vintage is, which would provide the network eﬀect. With respect to the
timing of the externality, it is very likely that this “support industry” would exhibit some inertia
in adjusting to changes in the industry it supports: it would need some time to develop after the
users of a particular vintage decide to switch to a particular brand, and also it will need some time
for that support to disappear even after a signiﬁcant reduction in the number of users, so we would
have a two-sided lag.5
It is worth mentioning that the qualitative results of the paper –the presence of ineﬃcient delay
and the transmission of the micro non-convexities into the aggregate data– do not change with
the length of the time period, so in this context, the externality lag could be very small indeed.6
Moreover, taking the approach of specifying a one-period-lag for the appearance and disappearance
of the externalities is just a simple case of a general distributed lag scheme including possibly the
current user base.7
Ignoring integer constraints on the age of the machine x, we will assume that8
F(x,n) > 0 ∀x,n (1)
F1 < 0 ∀x ≥ 1( 2)
F11 > 0 ∀x ≥ 1( 3 )
F2 > 0 ∀x ≥ 1( 4 )
5Ifw et a ke investment in durable goods for example, a real life example could be the availability of repair shops
specialized in a particular car brand, or even the availability of spare parts for a particular model.P resumably those
shops appear in response to the number of users of a particular brand or model, and it takes some time for them
to react to the change in the user base of those models.T hese inertia could be also the result of uncertainty on
government policy: in the case of Colombia or Peru, for example, repair shops and spare parts distributors sometimes
are reluctant to enter into the market at the same time a new car brand starts to be imported into the country,
because of fear of changes in import restrictions, for example.
6In Ruiz (1998) we also analyze the eﬀects of considering a “stock” version of this externalities: we could think
of payoﬀ externalities because of learning by using, and so the aggregate number of users in the past determines the
proﬁtability of a particular vintage.I n that case, even when everyone abandons a model, the payoﬀ of that machine
does not drop, since the stock of knowledge associated with that machine is the same.T he qualitative results are
essentially the same in that setting: ineﬃcient delay and non-smoothing by aggregation.
7The qualitative results of the paper do not change by introducing a general distributed lag of user base in the
determination of the network externalities.I ncluding the current user base in the distributed lag could only aﬀect
the result of the ineﬃciency of the equilibrium cycles.H owever, if the weight put on the current consumer base is
low enough, as compared with the past user base, the results of this paper are still valid.
8Strictly speaking, we should replace (2)b y
F(x1,n) >F(x2,n)i f1≤ x1 <x 2,
(3)b y
F(x1,n) − F(x1 + k,n) >F(x2,n) − F(x2 + k,n)i f1≤ x1 <x 2,
and (5)b y
F(x1,n 1) − F(x1 + k,n1) >F(x1,n 2) − F(x1 + k,n2)i fx ≥ 1a n dn1 <n 2
5F21 < 0 ∀x ≥ 1( 5 )
Assumption (1) implies that it is always proﬁtable to use a machine, regardless of the number of
users of the same vintage. This in fact allows us to avoid the issue of exit and re-entry which
could greatly complicate the model without any gain in insight. Assumption (2) represents the
eﬀect of obsolescence on the proﬁtability of a particular vintage, which can be understood as a
normalization with respect to the “state of the art” technology,9 whereas the eﬀect of positive
network externalities is captured by (4). We think of the eﬀect of obsolescence as reducing current
proﬁtability by a ﬁxed fraction each period a new machine arrives. That motivates assumption (3),
and together with network externalities, assumption (5). Another way to interpret condition (5) is
to think of weaker network externalities for older machines.
We will also assume that if a machine is more proﬁtable than another, then the eﬀect of
obsolescence does not modify this relative ranking: the former would still be more proﬁtable in the
future, provided there is no change in the number of users of both of them:
F(x1,n 1) >F(x2,n 2) ⇒ F(x1 + k,n1) >F(x2 + k,n2)( 6 )
Notice that the payoﬀ of a new machine (x = 0) is still not well deﬁned by these assumptions
on F(.). Since the network externalities we are dealing with appear with a lag, the externalities
a s s o c i a t e dw i t hanew machine have not had time to be built into the vintage. So the number of
agents using a new machine is irrelevant for the current proﬁtability of that vintage (although it
will inﬂuence its proﬁtability next period). Accordingly, we deﬁne
F(0,n) ≡ F(0,0) = 1 for all n (7)
where the last equality is just a convenient normalization of units and is without loss of generality.
It is worth noting that, for given n, the function F(x,n) is the result of two opposing forces:
on the one hand, there is the negative eﬀect of obsolescence as a machine gets older, captured by
F1 < 0. On the other hand, an old machine may be more productive than the “state of the art”
9In principle we can think of an alternative model in which the proﬁtability of a machine is only aﬀected by
physical depreciation but not by the appearance of a more productive vintage.H owever, we can always turn that
model into an equivalent model where the payoﬀ of each machine is normalized with respect to the proﬁtability of
the “state of the art” technology appearing each period as in our case.
The discount factor β in the normalized model would incorporate not only the eﬀect of discounting in the original
model, but also the eﬀect of the speed of technological progress, which we would require to be not too high with
respect to the original discount factor.F or an example of this kind of normalization, see Cooper, Haltiwanger and
Power (1995).T he advantage of using this normalization is that the model becomes stationary, with the consequent
g a i ni nt r a c t a b i l i t y .
6technology, if it has been used in the past by a large enough mass of agents. It is possible, then,
that the total number of agents N who own a machine satisﬁes
F(1,0) < 1=F(0,n) <F(1,N)( 8 )
In general, we call nl the number of users that makes a machine as proﬁtable in the second period
of use (age = 1) as a new one, that is
F(1,n l)=1 ( 9 )
In other words, for a vintage used continuously since its appearance in the market by a mass of
u s e r sb i g g e rt h a nnl, the payoﬀ is increasing from the ﬁrst period to the second and it is decreasing
thereafter (see ﬁgure 1). In the sequel, this need to “build up” the externality associated with a
particular vintage will be the source of ineﬃcient delay, as agents will want to wait for others to
bear the cost of building the user base, only to join them later.
Notice that, given assumption (7) the function F(x,n) is not monotonic in x for N>n l (it
would be monotonic only if N ≤ nl), and so an old machine with a user base bigger than nl may
still provide a higher per period payoﬀ than a new machine. In the sequel, it will be important to
refer to the maximum age of a machine for which this is still true. We thus deﬁne ˆ tN as that limit
age:
ˆ tN = Max{t : F(t,N) ≥ F(0,N)=1 } (10)
So, for example, tN is equal to zero whenever N<n l, as in ﬁgure 1, it is equal to one for N = nl
and it is greater or equal to one for N>n l. In the case of the ﬁgure, tN = 2for the payoﬀ function
with the highest mass of users (the topmost curve).
An example of a particular functional form that satisﬁes (1) through (6) is F(x,n)=δx(n+1)
for x ≥ 1, where δ is the ﬁxed obsolescence factor. For this functional form, nl = 1−δ
δ and (ignoring
integer constraints) ˆ tn = −
log(n+1)
logδ .
2.2 Strategies and Equilibrium Concept
Each agent is endowed with a machine at time t =0 . A strategy for agent i is a mapping si : N→N ,
where si(t) indicates the age of the machine used by agent i at time t and N represents the set of
natural numbers. Notice that we use open-loop strategies, that is, strategies as a function of time
only, and not as a function of the whole history of the game up to time t. The equilibrium concept
we will use is open-loop equilibrium, that is, Nash equilibrium in open loop strategies.






















Figure 1: Per-period payoﬀ as a function of the age x of the machine for a given (and ﬁxed) number
of users N.( nl stands for nl in the text)
The use of open-loop strategies instead of closed-loop strategies implies that agents may not be
using all relevant information to deﬁne their optimal strategies. In particular, they do not react
to deviations of a single agent. However, this is not a restrictive assumption in this setting since
we have assumed inﬁnitesimal players and payoﬀs that are independent of deviations of a subset of
agents of zero measure, so agents can “safely” ignore those deviations. With these two conditions
(inﬁnitesimal players, and payoﬀs independent of single-agent deviations), the outcome of an open-
loop equilibrium is subgame perfect, although open-loop strategies may not be perfect10. The use
of open-loop strategies has also the advantage of reducing considerably the strategy space, with the
added gain in tractability.
3 Planner’s Solution
As a useful benchmark to which we can compare the equilibrium outcome of the game described
above, we examine the centralized solution in this setting. Suppose there is a planner who starts
with a mass N of machines of the same vintage, or using the notation before, ni0 = N for some i.
The objective of the planner is to maximize the sum of individual payoﬀs (net of switching costs)
derived from these machines, by choosing the adoption dates (and vintages to be adopted at such
10For a discussion of this point, see for example Fudemberg and Tirole (1991).
8adoption dates) for each machine. In order to tackle this multi-machine problem, we will follow
two steps. First, we consider the solution of a planner who is forced to choose always the same
vintage for all his machines. Second, we examine whether this restricted solution would change by
allowing the planner to split his machines into two or more vintages at any point in time.
3.1 Restricted planner: only one vintage each period
In this ﬁrst case we solve the problem of a planner who cannot hold machines of more than one
vintage at a time. Since operating a machine is always proﬁtable, this planner will always operate
N machines of the same vintage, and we can reduce the problem to that of maximizing the ﬂow of












0i f st = st−1 +1
1 otherwise
(12)
where st is the vintage chosen at period t and zt is a binary variable that takes the value of one
when there is a switch in technology.
In principle, the planner has the option of switching to any vintage at every period t. However,
since the switching cost c is the same regardless of the vintage it chooses to switch to, the only
relevant decision at any moment is whether to keep his machines or to update them to the state of
the art technology. This means that we can restrict attention to the choice st ∈{ 0,s t−1 +1 }.11
Taking advantage of the stationary nature of the problem, we can rewrite it in a recursive way.
The present discounted value (per machine) of having a group of machines of age x synchronized
with a mass N of machines) is then given by the value function V (x;N):
V (x;N)=Max{−c + F(0,N)+βV(1;N),F(x,N)+βV(x +1 ;N)} (13)
where the ﬁrst term in the maximization problem represents the gains from switching to a new
machine of age x = 0: the planner pays the ﬁxed cost c per machine and gets the returns from
having a machine of age 0 this period and next period it starts with a machine of age 1, which
has a value V (1). The second term represents the gains from choosing not to innovate, receiving
the payoﬀ of a machine of age x and starting the next period with a machine of age x +1 . It is
11However, because of the presence of network externalities, this is not true for individual agents, as will become
evident when we analyze the decentralized outcome to the model.
9easy to show that V (x;N) is increasing in the user base N, because of assumption (4) about the
instantaneous payoﬀ function F(.). Moreover, the value function V (x;N) is decreasing in the age
x of the machines over the range x ≥ 1.12
The optimal replacement rule for this problem has been extensively studied in the operations
research literature. As one would expect, the optimal policy is a stationary control-limit rule
specifying a threshold ip(N) such that the machines should be replaced if and only if their age x is
higher than this threshold, that is xt = ϕ(xt−1), where the policy function ϕ(.) satisﬁes:
ϕ(x )=

x  +1 i fx  ≤ ip(N)
0i f x  >i p(N)
(14)




βx [F(x,N) − F(i,N)] (15)
and the second order condition requires F1(ip(N),N) < 0 which is satisﬁed by the assumptions on








1 − βip+1 ≡ V (0;N,ip + 1) (16)
which expresses the more intuitive condition that in order to ﬁnd the optimal innovation threshold
ip, the marginal gain of using a longer cycle of length ip +1 (the left side of the inequality) should
be no higher than the average gain from that extra period in the adoption cycle, expressed in the
right side of the inequality.13
This optimal policy eﬀectively implies adoption cycles of constant length ip(n). It is clear from
(15) that the length of these cycles is increasing in the switching cost c. However, the length of
the optimal replacement cycle is not necessarily monotonic in N even when F12 < 0.14 The reason
is that, due to lagging externalities and assumption (7), the ﬁrst diﬀerence F(0,N) − F(i,N)i s
decreasing in N, whereas assumption (5) implies that the diﬀerences F(x,N)−F(i,N)w i l li n c r e a s e
with N for all the other terms of the summation.
12The usual monotonicity argument applies: a planner with a machine of age x ≥ 1 can always replicate the policy
of any other planner with machines of age y ≥ x, and get a payoﬀ that is no lower than that obtained by the latter,
since F(x;.) is decreasing for x ≥ 1. Of course that is not necessarily true for x =0s i n c eF(0,N) <F(x,N)f o rx
low enough and N high enough, by assumption (8).
13Of course, the inequalities in (15) and (16) are due to time being discrete in this model. In an alternative model
with continuous time the two conditions would hold with equality.
14In fact, it is easy to generate examples of F functions for which the optimal threshold ip(N) is increasing for low
values of N and decreasing for high values of N.



























































Figure 2: Evolution of planner’s per period payoﬀ for two diﬀerent sizes of the mass n of machines.
3.2 Allowing simultaneous vintages
The previous exercise is the solution to a constrained problem since this planner is not allowed to
split his machines into diﬀerent vintages, starting from a bunched distribution. As opposed to the
usual replacement problem studied in the operations research literature, in this case, there is also
an externality problem. Although there is a positive network externality that would give incentives
to the planner to keep all machines in the same vintage, it is also true that these machines have to
bear the initial cost of “building” the externality associated with that vintage in the ﬁrst period.
The trade oﬀ between delaying the cost of adoption for a fraction of the machines and the
(positive) externality loss from “splitting” a homogeneous group of machines may result in the
planner splitting his machines into more than one vintage for some periods, resulting in a higher
average net proﬁtability. To see why this may be so, consider a planner using threshold ip(N)a s
before. Suppose he chooses to replace only a fraction γ of his machines when they reach age ip(N)
and the rest of them one period later, so that two periods ahead he again has a homogeneous group
of machines of age 1. Compared to the previous solution, he saves (1 − γ)(1 − β)c on the delayed
switching cost for a fraction (1 − γ) of his machines. On the other hand, he suﬀers a reduction
in proﬁtability during two periods: in the ﬁrst period, the loss equals (1 − γ)[1− F(ip +1 ,N)]
from the group which fails to innovate to a (possibly) more proﬁtable machine,15 and in the second
15Notice that the solution ip(N) to the constrained planner problem may involve innovating to a new machine that
has an initial lower productivity than the currently owned, that is, it may be that F(ip,N) >F(0,N) ≡ 1. In this
case (which requires c large, this eﬀect would give more incentives to the planner to split his machines into more than
one group.
11period the loss is equal to F(1,N) − F(1 − γN) which reﬂects that the machine was adopted only
b yaf r a c t i o nγ of users when it appeared in the market, thereby reducing its proﬁtability in the
second period of his life.
The planner would prefer not to split his homogeneous group of machines in this way if
(1 − γ)[(1 − β)c − 1+F(ip +1 ,N)] − β [F(1,N) − F(1,γN)] < 0. (17)
In particular, a suﬃcient condition for (17) to be satisﬁed is to have F22 > 0, which we will
assume throughout16. The eﬀect of this assumption on the behavior of the planner is clear: if the
positive network externalities grow fast enough with the size of the user base, they will outweigh
any incentive to delay the adoption time on a fraction of the machines used, since the planner will
prefer to have a homogeneous group given the convexity of F(.,n).
However, this is just one of the many types of alternative policies available to the planner. The
following proposition shows that the intuition of the previous example goes through for the general
case, and so the constrained solution is also the unconstrained solution for the planner when the
payoﬀ function is (weakly) convex in the number of agents using the same machine.
Proposition 1 The constrained solution to the planner’s problem is also the solution to the un-
constrained problem if F22 ≥ 0, that is, starting from a group of machines with the same vintage,
the optimal policy is to follow synchronized adoption cycles of length ip(N).
Proof. See Appendix.
4 Synchronized Equilibrium
From the set of open-loop equilibria of this game, equilibrium outcomes that involve synchronized
adoption cycles are of particular importance for the objectives of this paper. In this section, we
turn attention to equilibria where agents decide to synchronize their actions in common adoption
dates. In particular, we will deﬁne a synchronized equilibrium as an open-loop equilibrium where
agents coordinate their adoption dates, that is sj(t)=s(t) for all j.
16Notice that in (17) the left hand side is equal to zero for γ =1 , (since there is no one delaying adoption) and
negative for γ =0 , since that is equivalent to synchronizing everyone into a ip(N)+1 threshold, which is suboptimal,
by the deﬁnition of the optimal policy ip(N).
Therefore, to prove that (17) is violated for any γ ∈ [0,1] it is enough to show that the left side is (weakly) convex
in γ. That condition is equivalent to βNF22(1,γN) ≥ 0 which is equivalent to the claim since both β and N are
positive.
12Deﬁne a periodic synchronized equilibrium of length i –an i-cycle equilibrium–as a
synchronized equilibrium where all agents switch to the same new machine every i periods, that is,
for some integers i, k, and l,
sj(t)=s(t)=
 
0f o r t = ki+ l
s(t − 1) + 1 otherwise
(18)
The following proposition shows that when the eﬀect of the externality is low enough, there exist
(possibly multiple) periodic synchronized equilibria. Moreover, we can always assure in this case
that the planner’s solution is one of the equilibria in this case, a result that parallels Cooper and
Haltiwanger (1992).
Proposition 2 (Existence of an eﬃcient synchronized equilibrium for low N) For N<n l
an adoption cycle of length ip(N) constitutes an equilibrium [The planner’sp o l i c yi sa ne q u i l i b r i u m
policy].
Proof. The proof is based on the planner being able to replicate any deviation of a single agent
and, whenever the payoﬀ function is always decreasing in the age of the machine (N<n l), get a
payoﬀ that is no lower than that obtained by the deviator.
In particular, if the deviator decides to innovate before age ip(N), then he can get a machine
of age 0 and a payoﬀ that period of F(0,0), something that is also attainable by the planner by
innovating that period and getting a payoﬀ F(0,N)=F(0,0). Thereafter, the planner can follow
the deviator’s policy and get a payoﬀ that is weakly higher each period (strictly higher if the
deviator does not keep switching vintages every period).
If the deviator decides to delay adoption for t periods he can then rejoin the rest of agents by
innovating to their vintage and get a payoﬀ of F(t,N) at the moment he rejoins. The planner can
imitate the same policy, but of course cannot get a machine that has been used in the previous
period by N users as the deviator does. The best the planner can hope for after t p e r i o d si st og e t
a brand new machine (age 0). Nevertheless he is able to get a payoﬀ that is no lower than that of
the deviator, since for n<n l, F(0,N) >F(x,N)f o ra l lx.
Thus any deviation cannot improve over the payoﬀ of synchronizing over the planner’s cycle.
But since the solution to the planner’s problem already gives the maximum payoﬀ attainable, then
no such deviation can be proﬁtable. So the result follows.
Notice that the condition N<n l used in the proposition is crucial because if the group size
is bigger than nl, then an agent may have the opportunity of delaying adoption and then adopt





F(t,N) >F(0,N)=1 . The planner may not get a higher payoﬀ by following the same policy –he
cannot follow the deviator’s policy and get more than F(0,N) = 1 at the time of innovation (that
is, after t periods), since for the planner there is no vintage that has been used the previous period,
so he only has a new vintage and unused old vintages to choose from. The problem for the planner
is so serious that as it is shown below, when the group size is big enough (N>n l) the planner’s
policy does not even constitute an equilibrium policy for low switching costs.
Although the previous proposition gives us an idea of one of the decentralized outcomes of this
model, it is not by far a good description of all the possible outcomes. In particular, one of the
questions left open by the previous result is the possibility of multiplicity of equilibria, something
that seems a recurrent feature in dynamic games with positive payoﬀ externalities.18
The following lemmas characterize the two forces underlying the individual decisions vis-` a-vis
the behavior of the rest of agents: on the one hand, an agent would have an incentive to delay
adoption of a new machine since that defers incurring the ﬁxed cost c, and more importantly,
it allows him a “free ride” as other agents build up the externality associated with a particular
vintage (the increasing part of F(x,.)). Preventing that kind of deviations gives a lower bound for
the possible age thresholds that can constitute a synchronized equilibrium. On the other extreme,
for suﬃciently low adoption cost c, agents cannot wait indeﬁnitely to adopt a new machine, since
at some point the “stand alone” payoﬀ of a new machine would outweigh the loss of the spillovers
from leaving an old machine used by everyone. That gives an upper bound on any equilibrium
threshold.
Lemma 1 (Suﬃcient conditions for a synchronized equilibrium threshold) Suppose N>
nl, and all agents are following a synchronized i-cycle adoption policy. Then no agent would have
an incentive to follow a diﬀerent adoption policy if the following conditions are satisﬁed
F(0,N) − F(i +1 ,N) > (1 − β)c (19)
F(0,N) − F(i +1 ,N)+
ˆ tN  
x=1







x=0 βx [F(x,0) − F(t + x,N)]
+βi−t+1  τ(t)
x=0 βx [F(i − t + x +1 ,0) − F(x,N)]





17Recall that ˆ tN is deﬁned by the maximum value of t satisfying F(0,N) ≤ F(t,N). This is the oldest age of the
machine that gives an agent at least the same payoﬀ as a new machine. Note that for N<n l, ˆ tN =0 .
18See for example Krugman(1991) and Matsuyama(1991), and closer to this model, the results in Cooper and
Haltiwanger (1992) and Shleifer(1986)























































0 if F(0,N) − F(i − t,0) > (1 − β)c
Max{τ ≤ t : F(τ,N) − F(i − t + τ,0) ≤ (1 − β)c} otherwise
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice that equation (19) is also a necessary condition to prevent delay by a single agent, since it
represents the diﬀerence in payoﬀ from one possible deviation by an individual agent, as represented
in ﬁgure 3. In this case, an agent waits for one period after everyone else decides to adopt and
then “rejoins the group” by adopting the same vintage they adopted the previous period (which
now has age 1). However, equation (20) does not represent the net payoﬀ of any feasible deviation
–although this agent delays adoption for ˆ tN periods, condition (20) does not include the cost of
adoption of the group’s technology at time ˆ tN–, so this is not a necessary condition to prevent
delay.
Condition (21) has the opposite interpretation: it is required to prevent an agent from adopting
a machine before age i (the group’s policy). It thus gives an upper bound on the values of i that can
constitute a (synchronized) equilibrium threshold in the decentralized solution. It also forms part
of any necessary condition to prevent early adoptions since it represents the payoﬀ of a possible
deviation (early adoption) by a single agent, as in ﬁgure 419.
19The conditions of the lemma are similar in spirit to those in Shleifer (1986), although here agents are not restricted
on how far they can wait to use their option to innovate. In Shleifer, agents can only wait up to one implementation


















































Figure 4: Deviation in equation (21)
Using this lemma, we can compare the conditions for a synchronized equilibrium with the
planner’s policy derived in the previous section. Although we showed that the planner’s solution
can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome for a user base N lower than nl, the opposite is true
when the user base is bigger than that level: every synchronized equilibrium involves too much
delay, so agents coordinate on adopting new vintages with a frequency that is lower than optimal.
Proposition 3 ( I n e ﬃ c i e n td e l a yf o rab i gu s e rb a s ea n dl o wc) For any size of the group
N>n l, there exists a level of adoption cost cN > 0 such that if c<c N then any synchronized
equilibrium is ineﬃcient: i>i p(N).
Proof. Note that condition (19) in eﬀect establishes that any synchronized equilibrium threshold
i must be greater than ˆ tN. However, for c =0a n dN>n l the planner’s solution ip(N) must be
no greater than ˆ tN –since at ip(N)=ˆ tN +1 the right side of (15) is bigger than 0. By continuity
around c = 0, for small values of c, the planner’s solution does not constitute an equilibrium.
The preceding proposition shows that for a group size big enough, any synchronized equilibrium
is ineﬃcient. Note that when the group size is bigger than nl, an agent has an incentive to delay
adoption with respect to a prescribed synchronized rule because of two reasons. The ﬁrst is that
delaying adoption postpones incurring the switching cost c. Second, an agent has an incentive
to delay adoption and wait for the rest of agents to “build up” the externality associated with a
particular vintage –the increasing part of F(x,·)–, a “free ride” that the planner cannot take
16advantage of. This last reason is the most important, and the only one that drives the result of
proposition 3, since it also holds for c =0 .
The threshold nl determines how big the group needs to be in order to generate this ineﬃciency. For
a user base bigger than nl the payoﬀ function becomes increasing in the age of the machine during
the ﬁrst period (see ﬁgure 1); this allows an individual agent to delay adoption for a few periods
(less than ˆ tN) respect to the planner’s policy and rejoin the group afterwards. Doing that gives
that agent a higher payoﬀ than following the planner’s solution. Obviously, if the planner replicates
this policy, he cannot “free ride” on himself, as we argued in proposition 1.
One particularly striking result is the possibility of ineﬃcient collapse of investment in new






t=0 βtF(0,N). Note that in
this case20 condition (19) would be violated, which means that for any adoption threshold i that may
be proposed as an equilibrium adoption date, an individual agent would always have an incentive to
delay adoption for one period and then rejoin the others when they have a machine of age 1 –the
deviation in ﬁgure 3. However, for these values of c, the planner’s solution does involve periodic
innovations21. Thus, in this case, there is ineﬃcient stagnation: any synchronized equilibrium
involves no innovation ever, even though it is socially optimal to have periodic innovations.
Although an important result, the previous proposition only asserts the properties of the equi-
libria for a user base high enough. The next proposition tackles the problem of existence of such
equilibria, at least for high values of the user base N.
Proposition 4 (Existence of a synchronized equilibrium for high N) There exists a number
nh such that for all N>n h a synchronized equilibrium exists.
Proof. By analyzing (19) and (20) we can show that in both cases the left side of the inequalities
is increasing in i. Therefore, we can establish the existence of a number i1 such that (19) is satisﬁed
if and only if ˙ i ≥ i1. Equivalently, there exists a number i2 such that i ≥ i2 is a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for (20) to be satisﬁed.
On the other hand, one can show that the left side of (21) is increasing in i. To see this, denote
by t∗(i) the optimal t associated with a particular threshold i in the maximization on the left side of
the inequality (21). Now increase i by one unit to i+1 and take t∗(i)+1 as the choice for t. Note ﬁrst
that (i+1)−(t∗(i)+1) = i−t∗(i) and so τ(t;i)=τ(t∗(i)+1;i+1). Therefore, all the terms involving
i − t and τ(t) remain unchanged. That leaves only the ﬁrst term
 i−t
x=o βx [F(x,0) − F(t + x,N)]
20Note that this condition will be will be fulﬁlled for c>
1
1−β and high values of N.
21Equation (15) would be satisﬁed for some arbitrarily large but ﬁnite i, as limi→∞ F(i,N) = 0 for all N
17which is increasing in t22.S i n c et∗(i)+1 is an arbitrary choice of maximizer to the problem in (21)
with i +1 , then the maximum value attained in the left side of (21) must be strictly higher with
i + 1 than with i.
Given that the left side of (21) is increasing in i, then there exists a number i3 (possibly inﬁnite)
such that (21) is satisﬁed if and only if i ≤ i3. Therefore, an equilibrium exists if there is a number
i satisfying
Max{i1,i 2} ≤ i ≤ i3
We can ﬁrst show that i1 <i 3. To see this, analyze the maximization problem on the left side
of (21) when i = i1. Since i1 is deﬁned as the minimum value of i satisfying (19) then we have that
for all x ∈ {0,1,...i 1 − t} F(x,0) − F(t + x,N) ≤ F(0,N) − F(i1,N) < (1 − β)c, which means







x=0 βx [F(x,0) − F(t + x,N)]
+βi1−t+1  τ(t)
x=0 βx [F(i1 − t + x +1 ,0) − F(x,N)]






   i1−t
x=0 βx [(1 − β)c]+βi1−t+1  τ(t)
x=0 βx [F(i1 − t + x +1 ,0) − F(x,N)]






(1−β) [(1 − β)c]+βi1−t+1  τ(t)
x=0 βx [F(i1 − t + x +1 ,0) − F(x,N)]













where the last inequality comes from realizing that all the terms in the summation are negative.
Therefore, since for i = i1 inequality (21) is satisﬁed, and the left side is increasing in i we can
conclude that i1 ≤ i3.
The last part of the proof is to show that for N big enough, i1 >i 2. To prove this notice that
if we set i = i1 in inequality (20), then the term F(0,N) − F(i1 +1 ,N) is decreasing in N,w i t h
a lower bound equal to (1 − β)c. However, the second term
 ˆ tN
x=1 βx [F(x,N) − F(x + i +1 ,0)] is
increasing in N and unbounded (Recall that ˆ tN is an increasing function of N). Therefore, there
must exist a number nh for which i2 <i 1 and thus Max{i1,i 2} ≤ i ≤ i3. Since F12 < 0t h a ta l s o
holds for any N>n h.
One problem with the above proposition is that in general, it cannot rule out that nl <n h and
so the existence of a synchronized equilibrium for intermediate values of n cannot be guaranteed.
22Recall that the diﬀerence i−t isk eptc onstant (by the increasei n i) and so only the term F(t+x,N) decreases
as t increases. The numbero fterms in the summation is constant.
18It is also worth noting that the proof of this lemma does not rely on checking that the planner’s
solution constitutes an equilibrium, as proposition 2, precisely because when N is big enough, the
planner’s policy cannot be sustained in equilibrium, as we have already shown.
Although this paper is concerned with the behavior of individual units that are forward-looking,
it is interesting to mention the case of zero adoption costs. With no switching costs, agents always
switch to the vintage with the highest per-period payoﬀ, irrespective of the future evolution of the
distribution of vintages in use. However, this case is illustrative of the role of lagging externalities
and a non-monotonic payoﬀ function in the results drawn so far. In particular, this shows that the
“cost” of building up the externality associated with a particular vintage and the incentives it gives
for individual free riders are the main driving forces behind the appearance of ineﬃcient delay in
the model.
Proposition 5 (Uniqueness of the (Ineﬃcient) Synchronized Equilibrium for c =0 ) If
c =0 , there exists a unique steady state synchronized equilibrium for any group size n. Moreover,
in this equilibrium agents follow cycles of length ˆ tN and is thus ineﬃcient for N>n l.
Proof. The proof relies on the fact that for c = 0, agents always switch to the vintage with the
highest current payoﬀ, regardless of the future path of payoﬀs associated with any vintage. Thus,
any equilibrium policy can neither call for an agent to keep his machine past age ˆ tN –where the
payoﬀ is lower than that of a new machine– nor to innovate before ˆ tN + 1 –since he would be
switching to a machine with lower current payoﬀ than the one he is using. Thus the only possible
candidate for a synchronized equilibrium is an innovation cycle of length ˆ tN, which satisﬁes the
suﬃcient conditions speciﬁed in lemma 1. The ineﬃciency of this unique equilibrium is a direct
consequence of proposition 3.
This result also shows that –as would be expected–, the irreversibility associated with the
ﬁxed cost c is the source of the multiplicity of equilibria in this model, since agents have to take
into account the expected evolution of the distribution of machines over vintages when deciding
their optimal policies.
5 Staggered Equilibrium
Up to this point we have focused on describing a particular steady state, namely, one in which all
agents start with machines of the same vintage. The results we have drawn are, ﬁrst, that perfect
19synchronization is an equilibrium in this model, one that transmits the non-convexities present
at the individual level into the aggregate (macroeconomic) time series. Second, the periodicity of
actions is reduced ineﬃciently in equilibrium, so the interaction of individual agents not only fails
to smooth out the nonconvexities found at the individual level, but it also ampliﬁes them, and leads
to too much delay in equilibrium.
In this section we investigate the other extreme aggregate behavior in the steady state: whether
we can still sustain complete smoothing of individual lumpy actions in the face of positive payoﬀ
externalities. As opposed to the previous case in which we “start” the world with a distribution of
machines over vintages concentrated on a single vintage, here we will ask whether a non-degenerate
distribution can survive in the steady state.
Let nxt denote the mass of users of a machine of age x at time t, with x = {0,1,2,...}. A
distribution of machines over vintages is then given by nt = {n0t,n 1t,n 2t,...}, with the obvious
requirement that nxt ≥ 0a n d
 ∞
x=0 nxt = N. We will refer to a degenerate distribution at time
t when nit = N for some i, which is the case analyzed when we dealt with synchronized equilibria.
Accordingly, a non degenerate distribution corresponds to having 0 <n it <Nfor some i, which
immediately implies that at least two vintages are being used simultaneously at time t.






k denotes the number of vintages with a positive measure of users at time t. In words, a homogeneous
distribution implies subgroups of machines of the same size using diﬀerent vintages at time t. Note
that this deﬁnition imposes no restriction on the location of the k vintages being used.
Deﬁne a periodic staggered equilibrium as an open loop equilibrium where sj(t)  = sj(t)f o r
some j  = j  (and there is a positive measure of agents identiﬁed with index j and j  respectively),
but both sj and sj have the same period length i. (as deﬁned in (18)). Thus, in any staggered
equilibrium and at any time t, we have at least two diﬀerent vintages being used simultaneously
by groups of agents of positive measure.
The following proposition shows that, starting from a homogeneous distribution of machines
and for a switching cost high enough, there exists multiple staggered equilibria in this model, which
in fact says that another possible steady state for this model implies groups of agents leapfrogging
each other over the technology adoption cycle.
Proposition 6 (Existence of staggered equilibria) Suppose we start with a homogeneous dis-
tribution of machines over vintages. Then there exists a number cl > 0 such that, for c>c l,a n y
group size N, and any k ≥ N
nl there exists (many) staggered equilibria in which k groups of equal
20size N
k follow a periodic cycle of length ip(N
k ).
Proof. By lemma 2we know that for a group of size N smaller than nl there exists an equilibrium
in which the agents follow the planner’s policy (innovation every ip(N) periods). Suppose all agents
in each of the k subgroups of size N
k update their machines in cycles of length ip(N
k ). Since it is an
equilibrium to follow that policy when there is just one group of that size, then the only possible
proﬁtable deviation for an individual agent is to switch groups.
Suppose at time t an agent is originally in a subgroup (call it group A) and decides to switch to
subgroup B. Since by hypothesis both groups have the same size below nl –thus the requirement
of k ≥ N
nl–, then the per-period payoﬀ is everywhere decreasing in the age of the machine, and so
a planner can always follow the deviator’s policy and get an average payoﬀ per machine that is no
lower than that of the deviator.23 Since agents were already following a cycle of length ip(N
k )– t h e
planner’s solution for a single group of size N
k – then that kind of deviation is not proﬁtable. Thus
there is no proﬁtable deviation from the proposed staggered path, and so staggered strategies of
this type constitute an equilibrium .
Since the proof of this proposition does not depend in any way on the distribution of the k
groups over the ip(N
k ) possible vintages, it follows that there are multiple staggered equilibria with
k subgroups. Moreover, the number of possible subgroups is only restricted to be higher than N
nl
and obviously lower than ip(N
k ) which increases the multiplicity in that dimension as well.
Note that this proposition, since it deals with homogeneous distributions in the steady state,
allows for any size of the subgroups (between N
ip(N
k ) and nl) and any distribution of the groups
of size N
k across vintages. In particular, note that the subgroups can use machines of very close
vintages and still there would be no incentive to switch groups, even when that may imply just
adopting a new machine one period earlier or later than prescribed. The fact that they are following
the planner’s policy for each individual group does not mean that a planner would not prefer to
merge some of the groups together –especially in cases where the vintages used are very close24–,
since the gains in the increased externality would outweigh paying the cost of adoption earlier than
23See the p r oo fo fp r o po s ition 2 and the discussion that follows it.T he kindso fdeviations attainable by an individual
agenti n the two cases aree ssentially the same, andt h epurpose of the assumption k ≥
N
nl is also equivalent:o n ly
with a subgroup sizet h a ti sb elow nl wec a n assure that the payoﬀ function F is decreasing in the age of the machine,
and so, by following the same policyo fthe deviator, the planner can always attain a per-period payoﬀt h a ti sn o
lower that that of the former.
24Or very far away: note that in all this analysis, everything must bet a kenm o dulo ip(.). Thus, two subgroups
that follow the samea d option threshold ip anda tt i me t uset e c h nologiesw ith an aged i ﬀ e rence of ip − 1, will have
technologiesw ith just one year diﬀerence next period,s ince it is the turn of the group having ano lder technology to
adoptanewv intage.
21prescribed by the equilibrium policy.
Note that when the switching cost c is close enough to zero, a staggered equilibrium of the
kind mentioned in the proposition does not exist for N>n l. The reason is that such a staggered
equilibrium would call for all agents updating their machines to a new technology every period25,
eﬀectively synchronizing them into a single vintage. But then, given that F(1,N) >F(0,N)=1
for N>n l, an agent would prefer not to adopt continuously and hold his machine for more than
one period.
The fact that we can construct a staggered equilibrium of this sort for subgroups close enough
in the age of their vintages would, in principle, provide a complete smoothing of the individual non-
convexities, giving a time series of investment without cycles26. However, note that the proposition
relies heavily in the fact that the groups are exactly of the same size and thus the planner of a
subgroup can always replicate the payoﬀ obtained by an agent switching groups. That of course is
not true with subgroups of slightly diﬀerent size and with small switching costs, and thus suggests
that a staggered equilibrium of this sort is not stable to a small perturbation in the size of the k
subgroups, especially when the vintages are very close in age (that is, when the time period is small
enough).
One way in which we can see that synchronization in this context is the “natural” outcome is
to consider the particular case of zero costs27. In the next section, we show that for that particular
case, the unique (globally stable) steady state involves synchronization, which reinforces our case.
The previous discussion also shows that staggered equilibria (that could eventually smooth out
the lumpiness at the individual level) could disappear if we introduce small perturbations in the
distribution of machines across vintages. Another way to introduce perturbations would be to
consider that the evolution of the “state of the art” technology is still exogenous, but uncertain. In
section seven we show that even small aggregate shocks move the system away from a steady state
with complete smoothing.
25Recall that the size of each subgroup iss m aller than nl, and so the payoﬀ function F(x,n) is decreasing in the
age of the machine.T hen, when the adoption costi sz ero, therec a nnot bea ny equilibrium inw hich an agent receives
a payoﬀl ower than F(0,n)=1in a particularp eriod,s ince therei s always the option of adopting a newm achine
alonei n that perioda nd get F(0,0) = 1.
26As imilarr esult in the context of the rigidityo fp r ices and the eﬀect on macro variables isf o u n di nC aplin and
Spulber (1987).
27Recall our previous discussion on the relative roleso fthe switching costs andt h el a g in the network externalities.
The importanta ssumption too b tain the results abouti neﬃcientd e l a y in thism o del come from the introduction of
lags in the network externalities, whereass w itching costsf o r ce agents tob e forwardl ooking.
226 Convergence
In the previous two sections we have analyzed two possible candidates for steady state equilibrium
strategies. In the ﬁrst case, we showed that starting from a degenerate distribution, synchronization
can be sustained in equilibrium. On the other hand, starting from a homogeneous distribution,
staggering of adoption dates and eventually a complete smoothing of the aggregate time series is
possible, as shown on the previous section, although we argued that this last case is just a knife-edge
situation.
To further reinforce the intuitive idea that synchronization should be the natural outcome in
the presence of network externalities, we want to consider the issue of stability, that is, starting
from any arbitrary distribution of machines over vintages, which of the two steady states is the
one that arises in the long run. The general answer to this question is not straightforward, and is
extremely diﬃcult to answer for the general case. However, the particular case for zero adoption
costs yield a clear cut answer that sheds light into the more general question.
As before, let nxt denote the mass of machines of vintage x being used at time t and nt =
{n0t,n 1t,n 2t,...} denote the distribution of machines over vintages at time t. For any initial
distribution of machines over vintages nt, there exists an associated distribution of payoﬀs over
vintages πt = {π0t,π1t,π2t,...}, where πit = F(i,ni−1,t−1)a n dπ0t =1f o ra l lt.L e tXt be the set







and let ξt t h en u m b e ro fe l e m e n t si nXt. The following proposition shows that in the particular
case of zero switching costs, the unique globally stable steady state involves synchronized cycles of
length ˆ tn, so there is no smoothing by aggregation. Moreover, for n>n l, proposition 5 applies so
the steady state is ineﬃcient.
Proposition 7 (Global Stability of the unique Synchronized Equilibrium for c =0 ) For
a switching cost c =0 , and for any initial distribution of machines over vintages n0, all agents
synchronize into a cycle of length ˆ tN after at most ˆ tN periods.
Proof. For c =0 , any equilibrium path involves agents switching immediately to the vintage with
the current highest payoﬀ, regardless of their expectations about the future path of the distribution
of machines over vintages (note that the short-run payoﬀ function adjusts continuously to changes
in the size of the cohort). In the absence of any tie in the initial proﬁtability of two or more vintages
23–i.e. when ξ0 = 1–, this means that all agents will concentrate on the vintage with the highest
initial payoﬀ and follow a ˆ tN cycle thereafter by proposition 5, so in this case agents coordinate
into a ˆ tN cycle after just one period.
If there are more than one vintage giving the maximum payoﬀ at the initial date (ξ0 ≥ 2), then
any equilibrium policy involves agents switching immediately (at time 0) to vintages in the set
X0. The distribution of payoﬀs over vintages after this initial switch π1 can only be a degenerate
distribution –if all agents coordinated to switch into the same vintage in the set X0–, or a
homogeneous distribution with only vintages in X0 having a positive mass of users. Any other
distribution π1 could not be an equilibrium since there would be an incentive for an individual
agent to switch from a vintage with a lower payoﬀ to a vintage with the maximum payoﬀ, because
of zero switching costs.
If every agent coordinates in period 1 to use the same vintage, then they will follow a syn-
chronized cycle afterwards. If two or more cohorts with the same payoﬀ in period 1 survive, then
we know that each cohort cannot keep a machine older than ˆ tn afterwards, since the payoﬀ of a
new machine would then be higher and there are no switching costs. Suppose these cohorts are
able to keep their payoﬀs equalized in all the periods after the switching at time 0 (if not, they
would switch to the vintage that develops a higher payoﬀ, and we are again in the case of complete
synchronization).28 Then they will eventually arrive to a payoﬀ equal or lower than 1 (the payoﬀ of
a new machine) at the same time. At that moment, all agents in all cohorts have to switch together
to adopt a new machine. From that point onward, all agents have to follow a synchronized cycle
of length ˆ tN.
7 Uncertainty and Aggregate Shocks
In this section we extend the framework developed in the basic model by analyzing the eﬀect of
introducing uncertainty into the model. We will assume that the evolution of the “state of the art”
technology is not deterministic, but increases with random “jumps” in productivity. This type of
setup seems more natural when analyzing the problem of consumers who face an uncertain prospect
of new technologies coming into the market, since generally they have very limited information
28This ability tok eep the same payoﬀ for, say, l periodsw o u ld supposet h a t ,f o rexample, in the case of two
surviving cohortso fages x1 and x2 and sizes n1 and n2 respectively, we would need
F(x1,n 1) − F(x1 + k,n1)=F(x2,n 2) − F(x2 + k,n2), ∀ k ≤ l
which violateso u rassumption F12 < 0. However, tos how that this assumption isn o tc rucial for the validityo fthe
argument,w ec a n assume for a momentt h a tt h ec ondition abovei ss atisﬁed.
24about the capabilities of new models being developed by suppliers.29
As opposed to the deterministic case, the presence of aggregate shocks in the evolution of
technological progress generates a tendency for further clustering of agents in a few vintages, thus
breaking the “counterintuitive” staggered equilibrium found in the previous chapter. The intuition
for this result is clear: as a shock generates a big increase in the productivity of the new model
coming into the market, it may be more proﬁtable for some agents to bring forward the time of
adoption of a new model, since the extra burden of paying the switching cost in advance is more
that compensated by the extra gains in productivity of the new model. This means that two
groups that are using machines of very close vintages and that are also close to their (endogenous)
scraping age will, in the face of a big productivity shock, decide to adopt the new model at the same
time, thus collapsing two subgroups into a single one, and breaking a possible complete staggering
conﬁguration.
In order to model a stochastic improvement in the technological frontier, we will assume that
existing vintages become “older” only as a new vintage appears. Moreover, the aging process may
involve discrete jumps (of more than one period) on the age of all existing vintages. Recall that in
the simpler model, the appearance of a new vintage (which occurred every period), meant that all
existing vintages increased their index (age) in one unit. Thus, a machine with index i that had
been used by n agents in the previous period had a productivity today equal to F(i,n),and would
have a productivity next period equal to F(i +1 ,n),provided there was no change in the number
of users.
In the stochastic version of the model, we will consider that each period a new machine appears
in the market, but the relative proﬁtability of that machine with respect to all existing machines
is unknown until the time of its appearance. Thus existing machines with index i last period will
have an index equal to i + l this period, with l a natural number bigger or equal to zero.30
Our main purpose in this section is to show that the introduction of aggregate uncertainty
reinforces the tendency of agents to synchronize their adoption timing. In particular, we are
interested in whether complete staggering can still be sustained as an equilibrium in an uncertain
environment. For this, we develop ﬁrst a very simple case, in which there is a one-and-for-all
aggregate shock that increases technological progress, starting from a steady state of complete
staggering.
29Another interpretation for uncertainty in the productivityo fn ewm achines is also the extentt ow hich a support
industry, or learning eﬀectsw ill bei mportant for each model.H o w ever, wec onsidero n ly the case of uncertainty in
the intrinsic characteristicso fthe newm o del.
30Note that the case of l =0includes the casei nw hich therei sn oinnovation in thisp eriod, andt h us, no new
technologies appearing in the market.
25Consider a steady state in which we have some degree of smoothing by aggregation by having
k groups (of possibly diﬀerent size) using diﬀerent vintages at the same time. In period 0, and in
the deterministic world of the previous sections, the group using the oldest vintage would update
their machines to vintage 0, which just appeared in the market, and all other groups would have
machines with an index increased by 1 unit. Suppose now that instead, we have a once-and-for-all
jump in technological progress, and thus, at time 0, all machines that are not updated will have
their index increased by l units, with l ≥ 231. We are interested in whether the complete staggered
equilibrium can still be sustained after this shock. The following proposition shows that for any
staggered equilibrium, the presence of aggregate shocks that are big enough will tend to reduce the
number of vintages in use, by inducing the simultaneous adoption of a new vintage by at least two
groups.
Proposition 8 For any distribution θ corresponding to a staggered equilibrium with ﬁnite cycles
(i<∞) there exists a number lθ, such that, if l>l θ, then an aggregate shock that increases the
leading technology l steps will induce at least two of the subgroups with the oldest technologies to
switch to the same vintage.
Proof. See Appendix
A direct corollary of this proposition is then that the complete staggered equilibrium that would
bring about complete smoothing in the aggregate time series of investment will not be sustained in
the presence of an aggregate shock. This conﬁrms the intuition that complete smoothing is a knife
edge case in the deterministic case.
Proposition 8, however, does not specify the magnitude of the shock that would be necessary to
break the complete staggering conﬁguration that gives rise to a smooth aggregate time series. In
order to tackle that problem we conﬁne attention to one extreme: a particular case in which there
are k groups of size N
k ≤ nl using the ﬁrst k vintages available (from vintage 0 to vintage k − 1).
In a deterministic setting the equilibrium strategy as a function of the vintage of the machine in
use i would be
sj(i)=s(i)=
 
0f o r i = k
s(i − 1) + 1 otherwise
Consider now an aggregate shock of size l ≥ 2. As the shock occurs, agents with vintage k − 1a r e
left with machines of vintage k − 1+l>kand agents with vintage k − 2are left with vintage
k −2+l ≥ k. Suppose that agents with vintage k−1+l decide to update to technology 0, but not
agents with vintage k − 2+l, and consider the incentives of an agent who is in the latter group.
31The case l =1is the samea s the deterministic rate of technological progress of the previous sections.
26Suppose that complete staggering could be sustained in equilibrium even after the shock in
period 0. That would require having all groups update to a new machine at the prescribed time
before the appearance of a shock. In particular, it would mean that the group with vintage k−2+l
decides not to update to the new technology in period 0, but waits until next period to update to
an e wm o d e l . 32
Take now one agent from the group who decides to stay with vintage k − 2+l in period 0. If
that agent decides to switch to the new model (that has been adopted by N
k users) in period 0
instead, he will bring forward the payment of the switching cost, and thus the strategy will have a
cost of (1−β)c. On the other hand, the switch to the new vintage allows him to enjoy the beneﬁts
of a higher payoﬀ in period 0 although he will have an older technology for the rest of the cycle
(since he innovated earlier than his group). That represents a gain equal to
 



















where the ﬁrst brackets enclose the diﬀerence in the ﬁrst period in which the group switching is
made, and the second bracket represents the diﬀerence from the second period onwards from staying
in two groups of the same size using vintages with a diﬀerence of one period. Noting that we can
equate V (0; N
k )=1+βV(1; N
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1 − βk − (1 − β)c>0( 22)




































> 0 ∀l ≥ 2
32More generally, it would imply that during the ﬁrst k periods, all agents decide tou s ea n adoption threshold age
i equal to k +1 .
27where the inequality is a direct consequence of the properties of the planner’s solution, as described
in equation (15). Of course if one agent has an incentive to switch from the group that stays
with the old technology to the group that adopts at time zero, then every other agent would want
to make that switch. We would therefore have a collapse of (at least) the two group with the
oldest technologies into a single one, thus generating a non-uniform distribution, and thus some
non-smoothing in the next cycles. We can summarize the result in the following proposition
Proposition 9 Starting from a steady state of complete staggering in which all the ﬁrst k vintages
are being used by groups of the same size, an aggregate shock of any size will force the merger of at
least the two groups using the oldest technologies.
These two propositions then show the robustness of the main results of the paper. The in-
troduction of aggregate uncertainty generates a tendency for agents to synchronize their otherwise
staggered decisions. That is, for big enough aggregate shocks, there will be a merging of two groups
of agents that were using diﬀerent vintages up to the time of the shock.
This merging in the face of an aggregate shock has two important implications. First, it shows
that the complete staggering equilibrium that we could construct when the technological frontier
evolves deterministically cannot be sustained in an uncertain environment, thus giving support to
the idea that it was a knife edge case, not robust to exogenous perturbations. Second, the fact that
there is always a shock big enough to merge two subgroup using diﬀerent vintages, ought to give
credit to the idea that the system exhibits a natural tendency for synchronization of actions. What
this means at the aggregate level is that we will not see too much smoothing by aggregation (in fact,
no smoothing if there is complete synchronization), and thus the microeconomic non-convexities get
ampliﬁed at the macro level. It should also be clear that the introduction of aggregate shocks does
not eliminate the tendency of agents to delay their adoption time respect to the socially optimal
outcome.
8 Concluding Remarks
We have shown a model that combines a lumpy process at the individual level with a particular
timing of network externalities. The results of the model imply that in this economy there will
(generally) not be smoothing of individual decisions by aggregation, in accordance with some em-
pirical and theoretical ﬁndings in the literature33. This tendency for synchronization arises even
33See for example the work of Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1995) and Bertola and Caballero (1990) using U.S.
data at the micro level for replacement processes that would ﬁti nto the kind of non-convexp r o b lem analyzed here.
28without aggregate shocks that act as a coordination force, as in Bertola and Caballero (1990).
However, the introduction of lagging externalities into the model means that when the extent of
the spillovers is signiﬁcant, all equilibria in the model will exhibit ineﬃcient delay, when previous
literature could not rule out that agents could coordinate on an equilibrium with eﬃcient cycles,
as in Shleifer (1986) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (1992). Thus, in this model –and for externali-
ties big enough– aggregation ineﬃciently increases the volatility of the time series of investment,
instead of smoothing out individual non-convexities.
There are still some open questions in this analysis. The ﬁrst one is the complete characteri-
zation of the planner’s solution in the presence of network externalities when the user base is big
enough. Starting from a more general distribution of machines over vintages, a planner would in
principle “settle” into having a non degenerate distribution, with two or more cohorts coexisting
at any time. However, the inﬂuence of the (lagging) network externalities would force those two
cohorts to be regularly spaced across the support of vintages available. The same pattern would
be expected of the decentralized solution, thus providing support to the non-smoothing of the mi-
cro non-convexities in this model. Once again, the free riding problems that we encounter when
characterizing the decentralized solution would be present also in this context, so we should expect
ineﬃcient delay as a robust phenomenon.
One particular point that could be criticized in this model as a reﬂection of some macroeconomic
issue is the idea of network externalities introduced in vintages of machines. It could be argued
that this model can be a model of the behavior of one sector of the economy, where this kind
of externalities could be more plausible, as opposed to the interaction among diﬀerent sectors.
However, the same kind of issues encountered here would be found in a model where the positive
externality works not at the level of payoﬀs, but through the switching cost. One could think of
a model where the cost of innovation is lower the higher the number of people innovating at the
same time, because of scale eﬀects in the production of capital goods, or pecuniary externalities
from investment, as in Shleifer (1986). If the positive externalities take some time to set in as in
this model, the incentives to wait for others to invest and generate those spillovers appear again,
and so ineﬃcient delay would arise in equilibrium.
Another avenue of research necessary to understand the eﬀect of network externalities in the
smoothing of individual lumpiness would be to consider a stochastic environment, where agents
receive common and idiosyncratic shocks (in productivity, or in the cost of switching to a diﬀerent
machine). The interaction of a replacement problem with the evolution of the distribution of
agents over vintages has been studied by Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1995), in the context of
Theirm o dels, however, don o ti nclude any network externality aﬀecting agents’ payoﬀs.
29isolated agents. The introduction of network externalities in that setting could be an interesting
step forward in the study of economic ﬂuctuations.
30A Appendix: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a planner with machines of age ip(N) and take that as period 0. The optimal policy for
a constrained planner is to innovate to new machines (of age 0) at that moment. Suppose instead
that this planner updates only a fraction γ of his machines and keeps the remaining fraction (1−γ)
at the same vintage (no innovation).
Suppose the two subgroups eventually share the same vintage again in the future, and call t the
ﬁrst period in which that happens. Without loss of generality suppose also that following t the two
groups remain synchronized, since if it is not proﬁtable to split the groups once, it will never be
proﬁtable to split them again. The argument sketched in the text essentially showed that if t =1
then the planner is better oﬀ by keeping an homogeneous group of machines when F22 ≥ 0.
Case I: 1 <t<i p(n)
If 1 <t<i p(N), that is, if the two groups rejoin before the completion of another cycle for the


















where the ﬁrst line shows, respectively, the gains from the group that innovates at time zero, paying
the cost c and having an externality given by a size γN during t periods, and the gains from the
group of size 1 − γ which maintains the externality of the whole group for the ﬁrst period, then
for the next t−1 periods sees the eﬀect of that externality reduced to (1−γ)N a n dt h e np a y st h e
adoption cost c to rejoin the ﬁrst group when they use a vintage of age t−1. Note in this last case
the eﬀect of the lagging externality, since in the ﬁrst period after the two subgroups are rejoined
they still get the externality associated with that vintage in the previous period, that is, a user
base of size γN.
To determine whether this split of machines is more proﬁtable than a synchronized policy,
31we can compare the payoﬀ over these t periods to the convex combination of two planners with
adoption thresholds coincident with the ones used by the two subgroups (ip and ip = t) ,and using
weights equal to the fraction of machines diverted to each subgroup. This convex combination of














βxF (ip +1+x,N)+βt−1F(0,N) − βt−1c
 
+
+βt [γV(t;N)+( 1− γ)V (1;N)]
Note in particular that the planner following the subgroup that delays, may not be able to
achieve the same payoﬀ after adoption, since in that case, the subgroup is taking advantage of a
vintage that has been used in the previous period, something the planner with the delayed adoption
date does not have available.
The diﬀerence between the two payoﬀs is given by
γ
 t−1  
x=1




 t−2  
x=1
βx (F (ip +1+x,N) − F (ip +1+x,(1 − γ)N))
 
+
+βt−1(1 − γ)[F(0,N) − F(t − 1,γN)] + βt [γV(t;N)+( 1− γ)V (1;N) − V (t;N)]
= γ
 t−1  
x=1




 t−2  
x=1
βx (F (ip +1+x,N) − F (ip +1+x,(1 − γ)N))
 
+
+βt−1 [(1 − γ)(F(0,N) − F(t − 1,γN)) + γ (F (t − 1,N) − F(t − 1,γN))]
+βt(1 − γ)[V (1;N) − V (t;N)]
= γ
 t−1  
x=1




 t−2  
x=1
βx (F (ip +1+x,N) − F (ip +1+x,(1 − γ)N))
 
+
+βt−1 [(1 − γ)F(0,N)+γF(t − 1,N) − F(t − 1,γN)] +
+βt(1 − γ)[V (1;N) − V (t;N)]
where the ﬁrst, second and fourth terms are always non-negative (equal to zero for γ =1s i n c e
32that represents the optimal policy in the constrained case) and we can express the second term
as a function h(γ)=( 1− γ)F(0,N)+γF(t − 1,N) − F(t − 1,γN). It is easy to see that h(0) =
F(0,N) − F(t − 1,0) = 1 − F(t − 1,0) > 0 by assumption (8), and that h(1) = 0. Also h (γ)=
−F(0,N)+F(t− 1,N) −NF2(t −1,γN)a n dh  (γ)=−N2F22(t −1,γN). Thus, a suﬃcient (but
not necessary) condition for h(γ)t ob ep o s i t i v ei nt h ei n t e r v a l[ 0 ,1] is to assure concavity, which is
equivalent to the condition F22 ≥ 0a st h el e m m as t a t e s 34.
We have shown that the convex combination of two synchronized planners following the same
paths as a split group result in a higher payoﬀ. But because ip(N) is the optimal threshold for a
synchronized planner, then this convex combination must yield a payoﬀ that is no higher than the
payoﬀ of a planner using that optimal adoption threshold ip(N). Thus the lemma follows for this
case.
Case II: t = ip(N)
In the second case, suppose that the second group just skips one of the adoption cycles alto-
gether, rejoining the group that adopted a new vintage when it is its second turn to adopt. The














βxF (ip +1+x,(1 − γ)N)

 + βip−1 [−c + V (0;N)]
















 + βip−1 [−c + V (0;N)]













βx (F (ip +1+x,N) − F (ip +1+x,(1 − γ)N))


which is positive because of the assumption about positive externalities in the function F.
34Note inp articular that wec a nnota ssuret h a th
(γ) < 0f o rall valueso fγ and t, since for t low enough,
F(t − 1,N) >F(0,N).
33Case III: t = kip(N)+l, k,l ∈ Z,l≤ ip(N)
This last case represents a generalization of the previous two. In particular, the ﬁrst case is
given by k = 0 and case II is given by k =1 ,l=0 . The same logic applied to the previous two
cases goes through for this more general case. In particular, if l  =0a n dk ≥ 1( w h i c hm e a n st h e
group that is not innovating rejoins the other group after more than one cycle) that only represents
delaying the adoption cost in case II for l more periods.
In case I we saw that delaying adoption for t periods was not proﬁtable. In this case we are
delaying adoption for an extra l periods over case II, which gives the same beneﬁts as in case I,
but the losses are bigger: the planner now keeps an older machine as compared with case I (older
by ip(N) vintages), so of course the beneﬁts are lower. This argument in eﬀect indicates that, for
given l  =0a n dk, if a split is not proﬁtable, then it is not proﬁtable when using l, k +1 .
The same argument applies for the case where l  = 0 : if it is not proﬁtable to skip k cycles,
then it is not proﬁtable to skip k + 1 cycles either: the cost savings are the same as in case II, but
the losses in forgone payoﬀs are bigger now since the group that delays adoption starts the extra
cycle of separation with a machine that is kip(N) vintages older that in case II.
This inductive argument shows that no other split is more proﬁtable than the (already proven
suboptimal) deviations in cases I and II.
Of course, since the argument in all these three cases does not depend on the size of the group
analyzed, no split into more that two groups is proﬁtable, since it can always be decomposed into
multiple binary splits.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
In order to prove that these conditions deﬁne an equilibrium threshold i we need to prove that there
is no proﬁtable deviation by a single player from this common adoption policy. We will consider
ﬁrst the case of a deviator that decides to delay on the adoption of a diﬀerent vintage, and then
the case of an agent who decides to switch to a diﬀerent vintage before the time prescribed by the
synchronized policy.
Before entering into the details of those deviations, it would be useful to know the valuation of
an agent who happens to be outside the synchronized group: suppose all the agents but one are
following a synchronized policy of innovating to a new machine every i periods (or equivalently,
when their machine reaches an age i). Denote by V (x,y) the value for that last agent of having a
34machine of age x when the group has a machine of age y. then we can show that:
Lemma 2 V (x0,y) ≤ V (x1,y) for x1 <x 0,x 0  = y
Proof. Call agent A the one having a machine of age x1 and agent B the owner of a machine of
vintage x0. For x1 <x 0  = y, F(x1,·) >F(x0,0) because of a lower age (and maybe because of the
externalities if x1 = y). Afterwards, agent A can always follow B’s policy and get each period a
payoﬀ that is not lower than that of B35. Note that the condition x0  = y is important since it could
be the case that F(x0,N) >F(x1,0) because of the network externalities.
Lemma 3 V (y,y) <V(x,y) for 0 <x<y− ˆ tN
Proof. Agent A has now a machine of age x<y− ˆ tN and agent B owns a machine of age y,t h e
same the group has. Since y − x>ˆ tN then F(y − x,N) < 1=F(0,0) because of the deﬁnition of
ˆ tN in (10). Moreover, because of assumption (6) about the relative proﬁtability of two machines,
we have F(y,N) <F(x,0). From that point on, agent A can follow the same innovation policy B
uses and get each period a payoﬀ that is not lower.
With the use of these two lemmas we can show now that no deviation from a synchronized
adoption threshold is proﬁtable:
Deviation I: delay for t ≤ ˆ tN periods
Without loss of generality, set time equal to 0 at the moment where all agents but one adopted
a new machine . It is obvious that up to period ˆ tN any deviator that decided to keep his machine
in period 0 only has two meaningful options: keep his machine one more period or adopt the same
vintage the rest of agents in the group are using. The third option, adopting a new machine is
clearly worse than adopting the same machine the group is using: since N>n l and the age of the
machine the group is using is no bigger than ˆ tN, then F(x,N) > 1=F(0,0) which is what a single
agent can obtain by taking a new vintage in this stage. Moreover, the deviator that joins the group
could follow the same policy of the deviator that takes a new vintage and get a payoﬀ that is no
lower than the latter.
Having argued that a deviator who delays at t = 0 has only two meaningful choices between 0
and ˆ tN (either delay until ˆ tN or delay and rejoin the group), the ﬁrst condition establishes that the
35See assumption (6)
35cost savings from delaying adoption for one period and then switching to the vintage used by the
rest of agents (the right side of (19)) is smaller than the forgone payoﬀ externality, given by the
diﬀerence in the left side of (19).
If this condition (19) is satisﬁed, it will not be proﬁtable to delay at time 0 and “rejoin” the
group before time ˆ tN either, since the (per-period) loss in payoﬀ for any extra period of delay is
greater than (1 − β)c36.
Deviation II: early adoption: Suppose now that at time t = 0 all agents innovate to a
new machine and all agents but one will wait until t = i to innovate again. Consider an agent
who innovates before age i. Clearly that agent would not innovate –and thus separate from the
group–before the age of his machine is ˆ tN since it can always wait one more period to switch to
that new vintage, saving (1−β)c in adoption costs and receiving a bigger payoﬀ during that period
by remaining with the group. Left to show is that that agent would not want to adopt a new
machine after ˆ tN and before age i.
Suppose this agent decides to innovate at time t ∈ {ˆ tN +1 ,...,i− 1}. It is obvious that this
agent would not want to rejoin the group before time t = i because of lemma 3. If he decides to
rejoin the group before i+ˆ tN t h e nt h eb e s tt i m et od oi ti sa tt i m eτ(t) speciﬁed in the proposition.
Condition (21) then speciﬁes that the gains of this type of deviation do not compensate the extra
adoption costs and the lost payoﬀ (if any).
Since this condition is speciﬁed for the maximum over the values of t between 0 and i, then the
deviator would never wait more than one complete i cycle to return to the group or to continue alone
in cycles of periodicity i. In the ﬁrst case we have seen that condition (21) makes that deviation
unproﬁtable. In the second case, going alone in cycles of the same periodicity of the group is also
unproﬁtable since the deviator pays the adoption cost before the group does so and does not get
the gains from the positive externality of using the group’s vintage.
Deviation III: delay for t>ˆ tN periods
If we have an agent delaying adoption for more than ˆ tN and less than i periods, then because
of lemma 2it would never innovate to the same vintage the group is using when its age is beyond
ˆ tN, since the value of that machine is lower than the value of a new machine. Then left to show is
than an agent has no incentive to innovate to a new machine either after ˆ tN.
36Note that the deviator that delays at time 0r eceives a payoﬀ below F(i+1,N), whereas the agents that coordinate
on adopting a newm achinea tt i me 0g et a payoﬀa bove F(0,N)u n til time ˆ tN. Thus, if (19) iss atisﬁed, then the
diﬀerence between the two payoﬀs isg r eater than( 1− β)c, at least until period ˆ tN.
36Suppose an agent delays adoption until t ∈ {ˆ tN +1,...,i} and adopt a new machine afterwards.
Condition (20) says that until time ˆ tN this deviation is unproﬁtable, and afterwards, this deviator
would get a payoﬀ lower than that of a deviator of type II that starts at ˆ tN, so the combined payoﬀ
of this deviation is lower than staying with the group.
Left to show is the case where a deviator delays adoption for more than i periods. In that case,
we can always decompose that deviation into two parts: the ﬁrst part is a number ki of periods
(k ∈ N) where the agent just keeps his machine; followed by a second part, where this agent delays
for t<imore periods and then adopts a diﬀerent vintage (as we saw before the only relevant
choices could be a new machine or the same machine the rest of agents is using).
The payoﬀ of the ﬁrst part of the deviation is below that of staying with the group: because of
lemma 3 there is no gain for the ﬁrst i periods and because this deviator gets a lower payoﬀ than in
Deviation I for the next cycles (he starts with a lower payoﬀ when considering delay in successive
cycles). For the last t periods the payoﬀ is also lower than the corresponding payoﬀ of the agents
in the group by an argument similar to that in Deviation I and for the case t ∈ {ˆ tN +1 ,...,i}
These three types of deviations exhaust all the possibilities open to a single agent facing a
synchronized group, and thus, no single agent ﬁnd it optimal to deviate with respect to the group’s
synchronized policy.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 8
In order to prove this proposition, consider a synchronized equilibrium in which agents use the
same threshold age i<∞ for adopting a new machine. This staggered strategies generate a
steady state distribution that replicates itself every i periods. Denote the period t distribution by
nt = {n0t,n 1t,n 2t,...,n it}, where nxt ≥ 0a n d
 i
x=0 nxt = N.
Suppose at time 0 we introduce an aggregate shock that shifts the entire distribution n0 by lθ
“steps”, meaning that every vintage increases its age by lθ units. Suppose also that vintages j and
k are the two oldest in use by a positive measure of agents at the time the shock hits, that is
j =m a x {x : nx0 > 0}
k =m a x {x  = j : nx0 > 0}
At time 0, the subgroup with the oldest technology j still has to wait for i − j p e r i o d st ou p d a t e
to the state of the art technology, whereas, the next to thew oldest vintage still needs i−k periods
37to be updated. Suppose now that, after the shock of size lθ the two subgroups who were using
vintages k and j do not adopt a new machine. We have three possible cases:
Case I: Subgroup j adopts, Subgroup k does not adopt.
In this case we have in period 0 a subgroup of size nj with vintage 0 and a subgroup of size
nk with vintage k + lθ. Suppose that group k will adopt a new machine t periods later. An agent
would like to switch from group k to group j if a condition similar to (21) holds:
t  
x=0
βx [F(x,nj) − F(k + lθ + x,nk)] − c(1 − βt+1) > 0 (23)
In words, inequality (??) assures that an agent will have an incentive to switch to subgroup
j when they adopt a new vintage, stay with that subgroup, and then return to subgroup k when
they adopt a new vintage.
Since we have assumed that cycles are of ﬁnite length, this implies that agents have to adopt
at some point, which means that we require F(0,n) >c (1 − β) to prevent delay always to occur.
On the other hand, since all groups were using i as an equilibrium threshold before the shock,
we can conclude that the no delay condition was satisﬁed, for all subgroups, namely,
1 − F(i +1 ,n l) > (1 − β)c
where nl =m i n {n0t,n 1t,n 2t,...,n it} is the size of the smallest subgroup of the distribution of
agents over vintages. This implies that












βx [F(x,nj) − F(k + lθ + x,nk)]
Which means that there is a number lθ big enough to satisfy inequality (??).
Case II: Subgroup j does not adopt, Subgroup k adopts.
In this case the condition for an agent to be willing to switch from group j to group k following
38the same deviation as in the previous case is
t  
x=0
βx [F(x,nk) − F(j + lθ + x,nj)] − c(1 − βt+1) > 0
and we can use the same argument as before to assure that this inequality is satisﬁed for values
of lθ big enough.
Case III: No subgroup adopts.
In this case, take group j and suppose that an agent in this group adopts a new machine alone
and keeps it until subgroup j adopts a new vintage t periods later and then rejoins them at that
point. The net payoﬀ of this deviation is given by
t  
x=0
βx [F(x,0) − F(k + lθ + x,nj)] − c(1 − βt+1) > 0
which again is positive for high values of lθ. A similar argument goes through for subgroup k.
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